A right wing take over?
A special Q&A edition
A few weeks ago, as part of this newsletter, I posted an update about the sudden rise of Georgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia. Well ever since I’ve been receiving a lot of questions about the nature of the party, the conditions that have led to its growth and the larger implications for politics here. As part of my regular Polish-language column at Krytyka Polityczna magazine I therefore decided to write a quick primer explaining the basics of the situation. The Krytyka editors have kindly given permission for me to share the original English text, and given I’ve got a bunch of deadlines coming up, and the questions show little sign of slowing down, I thought I’d do so here. Hopefully the piece below will clarify some of the details that are being pushed to the sidelines in international media, and perhaps even assuage some of the fatalism that surrounds this topic. If you happen to read Polish you can check out the original, and links to all my other columns here. The basic gist, though, is that Italy is not doomed (just yet). I’ll be back with the usual weekly update in the regular format next Thursday, but until then buona lettura.
The rise and rise of Georgia Meloni
In just a few years Fratelli d’Italia has transformed from a fringe movement into one of the country’s most popular parties. But what does this mean for the future of Italian politics?
Over the past few weeks, commentators in Italy have been trying to digest a series of rather staggering polls. Since February, when Mario Draghi took on his mandate as Prime Minister, there has been an explosion in support for Fratelli d’Italia (FdI); a far-right party which emphasises nationalism, family values, and opposes “liberal [woke] political correctness.” The party’s growth has been extraordinary. In 2018 FdI were on just 4%. Now, two years on, they are at a projected 21%: ahead of both the Five Star Movement and centre left Partito Democratico, and almost on the level of Matteo Salvini’s Lega. But how did this happen? And what does it mean for the future of Italy?
What is Fratelli d’Italia?
Fratelli d’Italia is a traditionalist conservative party with links to grassroots extreme right movements. It was founded in 2013, as an offshoot of Berlusconi’s Il Popolo della Libertà, and provided a home for old Christian democrats, and a rag tag band of neo-fascists. They set out to make a popular right-wing movement with a serious face; something to counteract the clown-like persona of the media tycoon who, at the time, had made Italy the laughing stock of Europe. Their spokespeople have never shied away from anti-migrant and racist views, but they’ve always made less of it on the campaign trail than others on the right (notably the Lega.) They are, they prefer to insist, a party of ‘tradition’ and ‘strong identity.’ If it wasn’t clear what that meant, the the party’s name is itself a reference to the country’s national anthem, and the tricolore flag is present at 99% of their gatherings.
Who’s in charge?
The leader of FdI, Giorgia Meloni, has been in politics since she was a teenager. She grew up among the right-wing social centres in Rome, and, for a while, headed up a group called ‘Sons of Italy’ which openly glorified Mussolini. Meloni has played background roles in a variety of centrist and right-leaning electoral coalitions. She has particularly excelled, though, among the pan European right: she has close links to Marine Le Pen, and often speaks in admiring terms about the anti-liberalism of Fidesz (Hungary) and PiS (Poland). She is a Eurosceptic, and opposes the EU, but also frequently appeals to an idea of “European identity” which she defines largely in opposition to Islam. In 2019 one of her speeches circulated on social media as a techno remix. It’s hard to say if this was genuine satire, or an effective Trumpian-style PR exercise (the words? “I’m Giorgia, I’m a woman, a mother and a Christian”).
How did FdI get so popular?
The first, and most important, factor is the decline of Matteo Salvini. Readers will probably remember that, back in 2017-18, the head of the Lega was storming in the polls, capitalising on an anti-refugee agenda. Well, it’s safe to say he overplayed his hand. Salvini’s trial – for having broken international protocol by ‘kidnapping refugees’ during his time as interior minister – dented his popularity, as did his inability to disguise corruption within the party. To make matters worse, he’s flipped and flopped throughout this pandemic. First, he was against the lockdowns, then he was claiming they weren’t implemented fast enough; then that all restaurants should be open, but also shut down. Just as Italians were rallying, in solidarity, behind the ex-PM Giuseppe Conte, Salvini went on the offensive. The strategy backfired. Now, the Lega leader has fallen in line and joined the other parties in propping up the Draghi government. Currently, Meloni and FdI are the only major force in opposition, left or right.
So are Italians all fascists now?
Sadly, Italians have never exactly “stopped being fascists”; or rather, a good chunk of the population has always supported the ideology. Berlusconi was a right-wing libertarian, but even he knew he needed to wield extremist rhetoric on occasion. Minority militant groups – linked to fascist ideology – have been conducting terror attacks almost constantly since the collapse of the regime. In electoral terms about 45% of voters are planning to back Lega or FdI. Neither are fascist parties per se. But it does mean about 23% of voting age citizens support the conservatives, and, given all these groups have links to the fascists, some will have far right tendencies. There are other factors to consider here too. Most of the far-right support is concentrated in the countryside, and in small towns that have been hit hard by 20 plus years of stagnant productivity. Many cities, like Milan, Bologna, Florence and Palermo, to name just a few, are home to strong local leftist groups, with a more cosmopolitan outlook (though limited electoral expression).
How worried should we be?
Fratelli d’Italia are now in discussion with the Lega, and the two parties are planning a joint electoral alliance. If they succeed, they will almost certainly triumph at the ballot box. The consequences – whether ‘fascist’ or otherwise – would be catastrophic for women, migrants and queer people in particular. There are, however, some reasons to doubt the parties will manage to work together. The right in Italy is just as factionalist and divided as the left; in geographical and cultural support, in priorities, and, indeed, in ideology. Meloni’s main base is in the centre and south, but many in Salvini’s camp are the Northern Separatists; these are hard constituencies to unite indeed, and there’s nothing to suggest either leader is talented enough to do so. The most likely outcome is that FdI simply replaces the Lega as the dominant right-wing party in Italy. It’s also worth remembering that, while they are loud in opposition, if FdI were in power they would likely be forced to moderate at least some of their policies given their reliance on the EU’s recovery funds (and the strict conditions on spending therein).
When is this right-wing take-over supposed to happen?
National elections aren’t due until 2023, and all sides have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo for now. The biggest short-term test is the local elections, in which Fratelli d’Italia will try to get their candidate, Enrico Michetti, to be mayor of Rome. This would be an extraordinary coup, and is not at all impossible; victory in that contest would serve as the prelude to their eventual dominance in a general election campaign. In the meantime, the centre-left’s task is to try and hold on, to use their current numbers to have a say in appointing the new president in January 2022, when the incumbent, Sergio Mattarella, will step down. Once they have ensured a far-right candidate does not replace him they are expected to pass the baton.
So that’s it? Is Italy doomed?
There’s no denying things look bad. With the PD in a process of slow-motion decline the question emerges: does the left try and cobble together a new coalition of small groups? Or create a new party entirely? The answer, probably, lies in the middle. There are a few energies out there: the sardines, the cross-generational, cross-class anti-sovereigntist movement that, just before the pandemic, fuelled the largest civic movement in post-war history. Then there is the communist-influenced potere al popolo; the left factions of the Five Star Movement, and, indeed, (still) some within PD. These might seem like fragmented forces. Paradoxically though, while the rise of FdI is a huge threat, their success is also a useful reminder that, under the right conditions, even the smallest groups in Italy can grow, quite quickly, to gain nationwide support.
Thanks again to Krytyka Polityczna for giving permission to re-publish here.
About Me
My name is Jamie Mackay (@JacMackay) and I’m an author, editor and translator based in Florence. I’ve been writing about Italy for a decade for international media including The Guardian, The Economist, Frieze, and Art Review. I launched ‘The Week in Italy’ to share a more direct and regular overview of the debates and dilemmas, innovations and crises that sometimes pass under the radar of our overcrowded news feeds.
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